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states hold that the trial court must use its discretion in allowing per-
manent alimony, taking into consideration the husband's ability to pay,
wife's condition and means and the conduct of the parties."
One authority33 in the field found that nine of the forty-seven
statutes allowing the trial court to award alimony in absolute divorce
cases provide that the court "must" or "shall" allow alimony in proper
cases. In the other states the courts "may" do so or "have the power
to decree" alimony. He concluded that since the statutes place the whole
matter in the discretion of the court, these differences are probably
not significant.
From the standpoint of policy and in the light of the decisions, both
in Ohio and other states having similar mandatory statutes, the rule of
construction allowing the courts to exercise a wide latitude of judicial
discretion in the determination of the amount of alimony commends
itself as an application of good sense and inherent justice. Measuring
the statute under consideration by the yardstick of what is consonant
with reason and good discretion, one cannot conclude that the General
Assembly intended to preclude the courts from giving consideration to
the facts and circumstances of each case.
Sed quacre whether, under the statute, the court must grant a
decree for some amount, even though nominal, where it appears that
the husband is virtually indigent and the wife has sufficient wealth of
her own to support herself? L.S.F.
LEGITIMIZING ILLEGITIMATES - EFFECT OF STATUTES AND
OF PRESUMPTIONS
In Garner v. Goodrich,1 a child conceived before, but born posthu-
mously after a bigamous marriage, asserted a claim for a death award
under the Workmen's Compensation Acte, because of the accidental
death of his father. In order to recover, the child's legitimacy had
to be proved'. The Ohio Supreme Court, under the following statute,
held that he was legitimate and entitled to recover: "When by a woman
' Shirey v. Shirey, 87 Ark. 175, at 184, 111 S.W. 369 (I908); Johnson v. Johnson,
x6S Ark. 195, at Z03, 263 S.W. 379 (2924)5 Baker v. Baker, 94- Fla. oo2, ui4. So. 661
(1927); Dissette v. Dissette, 208 Ind. 567, 661, 196 N.E. 684 (1935); Glick v. Glick, 86
Ind. App. 593, 259 N.E. 33 (927); Mann v. Mann, 136 Kan. 331, iS Pac. (2d) 478
(1932); Lassen v. Lassen, 234 Kan. 436, 7 Pac. (2d) 120 (1932); Sango v. Sango, io5
Okla. 166, 232 Pac. 49 (1924)s Derritt v. Derritt, 66 Okla. x4, 168 Pac. 455 (97);
Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 8a6, at 8xg, 6 S.E. 630 (1887).
33 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, sec. oS, p. 266.
1 136 Ohio St. 397, 26 N.E. (2d) 203, 16 Ohio Op. 568 (i94o).
2 OHIO G. C. sec. 2465-82.
3 Staker v. Industrial Commission, 127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 6x6 (1933).
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a man has one or more children, and afterwards intermarries with her,
such issue, if acknowledged by him as his child or children will be
legitimate. The issue of parents whose marriage is null in law, shall
nevertheless be legitimate."'
Since the marriage was void because the mother was a bigamist, the
child would be illegitimate at common law.' Under the last part of
the statute, however, such issue is legitimized, the statute having been
construed to apply to a child conceived in adultery', and born of a biga-
mous marriage The court might have rested its case on this point
alone, but there was a physical possibility that the child was the issue of
the mother's previous marriage. No evidence to that effect was pre-
sented. The court, relying upon the first part of the statute, reached
the conclusion that since the second husband before his death openly
and notoriously acknowledged the unborn infant, it would be regarded
as the issue of the void marriage. The language of the statute seems
to indicate that acknowledgment is necessary only when parents marry
after the birth of a child, but in the principal case, and also in a case8
where the child was born in lawful wedlock, the first part of the statute
was cited. What the court is actually doing in both of these cases is
using the acknowledgment as a step in proving paternity, when either
the last part of the statute or the presumption of legitimacy would
have sufficed.
The courts of Ohio, in considering doubtful cases of legitimacy,
have always favored the child whenever possible. A child born in wed-
lock is presumed to be legitimate? This presumption also applies when
the child was conceived during wedlock but was born after the divorce
of its parents."0 In Mler v. Anderson," the Ohio Supreme Court held
that when a man married an expectant mother, with full knowledge of
her pregnancy, he was conclusively presumed to be the father of a child
subsequently born. The case, however, was one where the mother,
now a widow, was attempting to hold another for the support of the
child. As dictum the court said that this rule does not apply in cases
involving heirship or inheritance.' Does this mean that no presumption
O1o G. C. sec. os003-.5.
'Blackburn v. Crawford, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175, i8 L.Ed. x86 (1865).
'Ives v. Mc Nicoll, 59 Ohio St. 40Z, 53 N.E. 6o, 43 L.R.A. 778, 69 Am. St. Rep.
78o (1898).
'Wright v. Lore, iz Ohio St. 61g (xs6z).
'La Roche v. La Roche, io Ohio App. Z89, 29 Ohio C. A. 113, 30 Ohio C. D. Si9
(1917).
'Powell v. State, 84 Ohio St. 16S, 95 N.E. 66o, 36 L.R.A. (Ns), 25S (1911).
'"Vilson v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App. z58, z8 Ohio C. C. (Ns) 312, 29 Ohio C. D. 396
(1917). In Lyn v. State, 47 Ohio App. 158, i9i N.E. 100 (1936), the child was held
legitimate in spite of the fact that the mother was guilty of infidelity during the marriage.
245 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 6o5, S4 Am. Rep. 8Z3 (I 88 ).
'Id. page 480.
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arises, in such cases, or merely that the presumption is there, but not
conclusive? The interpretation given by the appellate courts of Ohio
would seem to indicate that the presumption is still there but that it is
rebuttable.'
That the presumption is conclusive in any type of case is questionable.
The special facts present in the above case perhaps justify the holding.
While there are no cases in Ohio expressly overruling it, there are de-
cisions which in effect seem to hold that the presumption is no longer
as strong as there set out.' This would be in line with the great weight
of authority in the United States.' Add to this the fact that Ohio
now has a statute authorizing the use of the Landsteiner-Bernstein blood
grouping test as evidence of non-paternity in both civil and criminal
cases," and the necessary implication is that the broad rule stated in
Miller v. Anderson is no longer law. From the wording of the statute,
it is conceivable that the blood grouping tests may even be used to dis-
prove paternity, in cases where a child is conceived and born in wedlock,
and where there was possibility of access, or even access.
In the absence of a statute children born and conceived out of wed-
lock are illegitimate.' Under the statute in Ohio, however, they may
be legitimated if the mother and father later marry and the father
acknowledges the child as his own.' It has been stated, however, that
whoever married the mother of the child, and acknowledged it, under
the statute, was the father of the child.'" Acknowledgment, for the
purposes of legitimation, may be by express statements or may be implied
from the father's action.' In most states the recognition may come
before or after the wedding.2' In Ohio the question has never definitely
arisen. As dictum, however, it has been mentioned that acknowledg-
"Supra, note 8, where the presumption was given weight, but further proof of
paternity required; supra, note so, where the presumption was sufficient in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
" Craner v. State, zs Ohio L. Abs. 761 (2936). The court says in this case that the
presumption is "almost" irrebuttable. State v. Oldaker, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 495 (1938),
holds that the presumption is not conclusive, but rather than overrule Miller v. Anderson,
they say that according to the facts of the case the child was not truly born or conceived
in wedlock.
'Isn re Jones Estate, 8 A. (zd) 631 (Vt. 1939); Mitchell v. Mitchell, ii A.
(ad) 898 (Me. 5940).
OHio G. C. sections 2122-1, isa2a-a. See also: Note in 6 Ohio St. L. J. aoo.
"'Ng. Suey Hi v. Weedin, 2 F. (ad) Soi (9a7).
'5Supra, note 4.
'0State v. Hayes, 62 Ohio App. a8g, 23 N.E. (2d) 959, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 1S4, 16
Ohio Op. so (939). See also: Note in 6 Ohio St. L. J. 198, where the writer
questions the validity of this statement.
2'Eichorn v. Zedaker, io9 Ohio St. 6o9, 44. N.E. 249 (1924).
2 Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 55, 97 N.E. 871 (191 a). McBride v. Sullivan,
x55 Ala. 174, 45 So. 902 (1908).
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ment before marriage may be sufficient, even if no acknowledgment
after marriage can be shown.2
While in Ohio legitimation is only possible under the aforementioned
statute, other states have legislation broader in scope. Michigan and
California have statutes which legitimate bastards, even though there has
been no marriage of any kind between the parents. In Michigan, a
formal written acknowledgment by the father filed with the probate
judge is all that is needed.' In California, the father need only
publicly recognize the child as his own, receive it into his home, and
treat it as legitimate." Arizona has taken the most liberal attitude in its
statute, which provides that every child is the legitimate issue of its
natural parents.'
A difficult problem is legitimation concerns the status of a child
conceived during the mother's first marriage, but born during her
second. Two presumptions conflict; one, that since the child is con-
ceived during the first marriage, he is an issue of it; the other, that a
child born in wedlock is an issue of that marriage. Under such circum-
stances it has been held that the presumptions are of no avail, and that
paternity must be proved. '
R. C. C.
EVIDENCE
SCOPE OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION IN OHIO
The plaintiff entered a hospital for an operation at the suggestion of
the defendant. The defendant prescribed a local anaesthetic consisting
of novocaine and adrenalin which was prepared by an employee of the
hospital in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant injected the fluid without an independent investigation, that
the fluid contained alcohol and that the plaintiff suffered severely as a
result. A hospital nurse testified for the defendant and the plaintiff
attempted to cross-examine her as to questions asked her by the defendant
as to the possibility of alcohol having been furnished to him instead of
the anaesthetic he had prescribed. The trial court held that the plaintiff
could not cross-examine as to matters not gone into on the direct. On
appeal, held error.'
'Stradling v. Printz, io Ohio L. Abs. 134, 136 ('93').
'In re Harper's Estate, Z7Z Mich. 476, 262 N.W. 289 (1935).
"In re Flood's Estate, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P. (2d) 579 ('933).
'Arilz. Rev. Code, sections 273-285 (938); lo re Silva's Estate, 3z Ariz. 573, a6i
P. 40 (19±7).
"Vulgamore v. Unknown Heirs of Vulgamore, 7 Ohio App. 374, 27 Ohio C. C.
(NS) 445, 29 Ohio C. D. 134, 14 Ohio L. Rep. 5s, 38 A.L.R. 1367 (91S).
'Abcrcrombe v. Roof, 64 Ohio App. 365, 17 Ohio Op. zs (sgo),
